
CHIPS/UNEX Lessons Learned



Mark Hurwitz/UCB Ellen Riddle-Taylor/UCB Mike Sholl/UCB David Pierce/GSFC

September 30, 2003 Explorers Retreat



CHIPS/UNEX Lessons Learned

OVERVIEW OF UNEX AO

CHIPS LESSONS LEARNED

UNEX LESSONS LEARNED



Explorer Program Objectives

- Accomplish frequent, high quality space science investigations utilizing innovative, streamlined, and efficient management approaches.
- Reduce cost and improve performance by selecting investigations for which investigators will commit to cost limits, control business and technical processes, and apply and transfer new technology.
- Enhance public awareness of, and appreciation for, space science and to incorporate educational and public outreach activities as integral parts of space science investigations.
- Assist NASA in achieving its goal for the participation of small disadvantaged businesses, women-owned small businesses, Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and Other Minority Universities in NASA procurements.
- Explorer program classes are characterized by the scope of the mission, based primarily on cost and secondarily on payload size and mass and launch vehicle capabilities.
- <u>University-Class Explorers (UNEX)</u> are Space Science investigations characterized by a definition, development, launch service, and mission operations and data analysis cost not to exceed \$13 million (in Fiscal Year 1998 dollars) total cost to NASA.



University Class Missions

- Project Management of GSFC University Class missions.
- Serve as a facilitator for the PI to assure Mission Success.
- Funding Administration, Coordinate Reviews.
- Advocacy for PI/Mission to GSFC and NASA HQ.
- Fiduciary Responsibility to NASA to ensure mission is achieved in compliance with committed cost, schedule, performance, reliability, and safety requirements.
- Provide agreed upon support as requested by the PI.



University Class Explorers (UNEX) Project

Space Science investigations characterized by a definition, development, launch service, and mission operations and data analysis cost not to exceed \$13 million total cost to NASA.

Education and Outreach to precollege education and enhancement of public understanding of space science required.

Program committed to visible/meaningful participation of HBCUs/OMUs Launch readiness date of no later than June 30, 2001.

UNEX AO(1998): 29 UNEX Mission Proposal / 6 Mission of Op Received

- 15 ELVs, 2nd payloads
- 8 Balloons
- 6 Shuttle Attached Payloads and Freeflyers
- The Missions selected were from the following NASA science themes:
- CHIPS / U of Cal/Berkley -Structure and Evolution of the Universe.

IMEX /U of Minn. - The Sun-Earth Connection

Both Missions selected were rated Category 1, Low Risk missions as Secondary payloads to be launched on Russian ELV and USAF Titan IV



NASA's Explorer Program University Class Explorers (UNEX) Project

(CHIPS) - Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer

The Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer (CHIPS) spacecraft will use an extreme ultraviolet spectrograph during its one-year mission to study the "Local Bubble," a tenuous cloud of hot gas surrounding our Solar System that extends about 300 light- years from the Sun. Scientists believe that the million-degree gas in this region is generated by supernovae and stellar winds from hot stars, but want to better understand the origins and cooling of this gas, and apply knowledge of these processes to the study of other galaxies beyond our Milky Way.

The Principal Investigator for CHIPS is Dr. Mark Hurwitz of the University of California, Berkeley. The Earth-orbiting mission will cost \$9.8 million, including launch, and will be launched aboard a commercial Final Analysis Inc. Satellite (FAISAT) as a secondary payload on a Russian Cosmos rocket in mid-2001.



CHIPS' Launch Saga

- UNEX press release was put out on the missions, surprised the White House & the Office of Space Transportation Policy (OSTP), an interagency team comprised of FAA, NASA, Commerce, US Trade reps., etc met to discuss issue.
- NASA tried to obtain an exception for QuickRide regarding the foreign launch restriction. QR sold as an exception to the policy, and CHIPS as an instrument flying on a commercial bus that happened to fly on a foreign launcher was outside the intent of the policy restriction. OSTP would not budge on Launch Policy.
- With their baseline plan gutted, the CHIPS team undertook a task of far greater scope: developing a dedicated small satellite and identifying a path to orbit aboard a U.S. launch vehicle. Code M designated CHIPS as a secondary payload and provided launch on a Delta-II/GPS launch. The scope of the project changed yet again when, in late 2001, growth in the GPS mass made that opportunity unavailable.
- On the verge of cancellation, NASA identified a launch opportunity for CHIPS with ICESat. But the interfaces, launch orientation, and the orbit were dramatically different from those for which the instrument and spacecraft had been designed.



CHIPS Mission Overview





Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer

Mission Design

- Orbit: Inclination 94°; 600 km circular
- Mission Lifetime: 1 year
- Launch Vehicle: Delta II 7320, Secondary P/L with ICESat
- > Spacecraft: 3-Axis stabilized, three reaction wheels, +/-2° accuracy
- Mass: Observatory: 111 kg estimated; 35% margin (170 kg)
- Power: Observatory requirement: 42 watts; 22% margin (52 watts)
- Ground Segment: RHESSI GS, ITR GS, Adelaide, AUS., WFF(backup)
 16 Mb/day data volume, 2 passes/day
- Operations: Initially: MOC @ SpaceDev, SOC at UCB; later transitioned MOC to UCB

Operational Phases

- Launch & early operations: 30 days
- Minimum science requirement: 7 months (estimated pre-launch)
- Mission lifetime: 12 months, Design lifetime: 18 months



Project Overview





Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer

- First University-Class Explorer (UNEX)
 - Confirmed as low cost, "medium risk" mission judged under UNEX standards
 - Instrument fabricated at Space Sciences Lab, UCB
 - Spacecraft fabricated at SpaceDev, Inc., Poway, CA
 - Attitude control subcontracted to Dynacon Inc., Toronto
 - Largely single-string hardware, with targeted redundancy;
 extensive use of commercial parts in spacecraft
- Cost breakdown (real year dollars)
 - Funded by grant to U.C. Berkeley (\$16M cost cap mission)
 - \$14 M flight hardware
 - \$2 M Phase E mission ops & data analysis
 - Separate \$2 M LV integration provided by Code M




S/C Overview



Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer



- Solar Panels
 - Body Mounted, Aluminum honeycomb construction. Dual junction GaAs solar arrays.
 Power Positive in any configuration
- Batteries are sealed NiCd variant
 - 10-cell fiber-Ni-Cd battery 12V, 6.5Ah
- RF System is Sounding Rocket Tx/Rx (Emhiser)
- 3-axis stabilization
 - sun sensors, Magnetometer
 - Rate sensors, Lunar sensor
 - Reaction wheels, Torque coils
- Single-string, commercial parts; limited screening with targeted redundancy






CHIPS Diffraction Grating Array





Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer



The six creditcard sized diffraction gratings of the CHIPS spectrograph



CHIPS – The Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer





Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer



BOEING PROPRIETARY



ICESat/CHIPSat Configuration Requirements

John F. Kennedy Space Center

Vehicle configuration: 7320-10C

· Launch site: SLC-2 at VAFB

Launch date: 15 December 2002 (NET)

Unique mission requirements

- 3 99.7% PCS

Reduced Height Dual payload attach fitting(RHDPAF)

Instrumentation (a la Jason/TIMED)

RHDPAF contamination barrier

BBQ roll (0.8 - 1.2dps)during coast phase

- Remove 60-in² A/C vent door

 Second-Stage dome foil and sidewall blankets due to PLF A/C from 55±5⁰ F

Retro nozzles with 35-degree cant angle

- Class 10K pad processing

PLF cleaning to VC-6

· ICESat requirements

Mass: 1030kg (max)

- Two 61 pin PAF umbilicals

Three 24-in. diam. PLF doors

 T-0 GN2 Purge (Teflon tubing under PLF blanket wrapped with 1.5" aluminized Kapton)

Spin at separation

- Fairing Purge Tubing cleaned to level 100A

· CHIPSat requirements

- Mass (Separating): 64.1 kg


One 37 pin connector

GN2 purge through liftoff

9-in heavyweight clampband assembly & retention system

RHDPAF cleaning to VC-3

- Electrical and purge bracket guards/shields






Mission Operations Overview



Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer








Awaiting Launch





Launch January 12, 2003





CHIPS LESSONS LEARNED



Lessons Learned – Formulation Phase

- Delays resulting from Launch Vehicle issues caused some beneficial things to happen:
 NASA gave CHIPS a total of \$405K (liened against Phases B-D) and 1 yr for Phase A.
 During concept study period, CHIPS addressed weaknesses identified during TMCO.
 Opportunity to better define long-lead items, perform detailed engineering of challenging structures & electronics
- ☐ Did not do FMECA/Fault Tree Analysis early on.



Lessons Learned - Implementation

- □ Geography matters!
 - □ P.I. / instrument team, S/C contractor, environmental test facility, and launch site linked by modest drives & inexpensive flights; greatly facilitated exchanges of personnel and equipment
 - ☐ However, long term travel of key members should be considered a mission risk and thought through carefully.



Lessons Learned – Project Management

Tea	am Leadership wore multiple hats during the mission.	
	Org chart undermined Clear Roles and Responsibilities.	
	☐ I&T Manager answered to the S/C Mgr, not to the PM	
	Difficult for single person to do multiple jobs well.	
	While intent and result was to keep costs low, there was real risk of missing launch	of
	Level of effort required for project management of a small mission doesn't scale down as quickly as total cost	l
	Small missions have tighter margins with little reserve for slips.	
the Inc.	e CHIPS success is largely due to a close partnership betwe instrument team at Berkeley, the spacecraft team at Spacel , GSFC, SwRI, and Swales, and outstanding individual effor n key engineers.	Dev
		∠∪



Lessons Learned – Project Management, Staffing Experience

- ☐ CHIPS proves that young professionals, with mentoring can lead a project successfully.
- ☐ Mix of experienced and more junior team members need not all be at same "level." Example: S/C was developed by relatively junior engineers but supported by experienced technician from SWRI.
- ☐ The challenges of the project and the "can-do" attitude encouraged the core workers at Berkeley and SpaceDev to stay with the project throughout its lifetime, and these young engineers are now strengthening projects such as JWST, THEMIS, and SNAP.



Lessons Learned – Schedule

At Selection (Sep 98)

•	CSR	3/15/99
•	PDR/CAR	4/15/99
•	Confirmation	5/1/99
•	Begin Phase C/D	5/15/99
•	DVR	9/15/99
•	MRR	4/10/01
•	Launch	5/14/01
•	Phase E starts	6/15/01

At Selection:

7 Month Formulation Planned25 Month Development Planned

At Completion:

27 Month Formulation24.5 Month Development

At Completion

US Launch Policy Issue

Ok	otain Spacecraft Vendor	
•	CSR	9/1/99
•	PDR/CAR	9/1/00
•	Confirmation	12/1/00
•	Begin Phase C/D	1/1/01
•	DVR	4/17/01
Mo	ove from GPS Launch to ICESat	
•	Delta DVR	9/1/01
•	Pre Environmental	8/15/02
•	Pre-Ship/Mission Ops	10/6/02
•	MRR	11/8/02
•	Launch	1/12/03
•	Phase E Starts	2/15/03



Lessons Learned – Cost

What did CHIPS really Cost?

Original CHIPS Proposal Cost (9/98)	<u>\$9.8M (FY98\$)</u>
-------------------------------------	------------------------

C	Code S Mission Cost Cap - Confirmation (12/00) <u>\$</u>			\$
•	UCB Cost	\$	13.3M	
•	NIAT Cost Contribution	\$	2.7M	
	(plus a separate Code M Integration Contribution of \$ 2.0	M)		

Co	ode S Mission Total Cost - Launch (1/03)	\$23.0M (RY\$)
•	UCB Development Cost(Phases A-D)	\$ 14.0 M

• UCB Phase E costs \$ 2.0 M

CATSAT Mini-DPAF (recovered Code S sunk cost)
 7.0 M

(Actual Code M Integration Contribution of \$ 1.0 M)

Total NASA Cost for CHIPS

\$24.0M (RY\$)



Lessons Learned – Contract Management

☐ CHIPS funded as a grant, not contract, to UCB ☐ Significantly less burdensome to P.I. team ☐ Less rigorous reporting requirements were offset by close supervision by GSFC and open lines of communication with P.I. and financial administrator ☐ Main subcontract for S/C structured as fixed-price but subject to evolving requirements, inevitably creating tensions [not unique to UNEX] ☐ Small start-up nature of S/C provider made rigid linking of payments and deliverables difficult ☐ Specifications/requirements were primarily high-level; should have included clearer definition of plans for technical approach and implementation 24



Lessons Learned – Reviews

- Through continuity in the membership of panels, NASA-led reviews became recognized as opportunities to strengthen the project through advice and experience, not forums to "beat up on" the project.
- The continuity of the review team from one review to the next was essential and helped the project from arguing the same old points over and over again.
- Review Team Members often helped the project team to address the concerns identified in the reviews.



Lessons Learned – Reviews

At Selection (Per AO)

- Concept Study Review
- CAR, CRR & CR
- Design & Verification Review
- Mission Readiness Review

As Implemented

- Concept Study Review
- CAR, CRR, & CR
- Design & Verification Review
- Delta-DVR (from GPS to ICESat primary)
- S/C Bus Pre-Ship
- Pre-Environmental
- Pre-Ship Review
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Mission Readiness Review



Peer Reviews



SpaceDev

Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer

TIMs: (Working Meetings)

RF/Com (8 Dec 99)

ACS (8 Dec 99)

Software (2 Sep 00)

SBC (10 Apr 00)

Ground Station (7 Jul 00)

Contamination control (21 Mar 01)

ADP review (13 Dec 02)

Peer Reviews: (Documented)

Detector Door (17 Feb 00)

SBC (4 Apr 00)

TDC (12 Apr 00)

Detector Mechanical (6 Jun 00)

Grounding (9 Jun 00)

DPU/HK (21 Jun 00)

FMECA (28 Jul 00)

Metering Structure (2 Aug 00)

LVPS (26 Sep 00)

Slit Towers (16 Oct 00)

ACS (22 Feb 01)

UCB Flight S/W (28 Feb 01)

Power System (13 Apr 01)

AEF review (27 Feb 02)

MOB Tiger Team (14 May 02)

Telecom (Jan 02)

Software (10 Jul 02)

ACS node requal. (03 Oct 02)



Lessons Learned – Misc. Technical Issues

☐ Developing MSPSP much more labor-intensive than expected ☐ CHIPS team perceived different requirements from launch vehicle side (KSC/VAFB/Boeing) and from GSFC Should identify "single point of contact" with strong experience in appropriate level of detailed needed for various analyses, etc. ☐ Internet-based mission operations extremely helpful; enabled flightlike operations environment to be created at any site (SpaceDev, UCB, KAFB, VAFB). Combined with fact that development engineers served as flight controllers, this led to significant mitigation of risk during early mission operations. ☐ 3 axis solar array placement allowed for screw-ups ☐ "Science Projects" (such as the original RF system) should be tied to firm cut off dates.

Test, Test, Test helped CHIPS be successful

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Observatory Testing





Cosmic Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer

EMI/EMC (Battel Engineering) 1 August 2002 Completed successfully Vibration testing AEF, 28-31 August 2002 Random/Sine/Sine burst Magnetic dipole testing, 6 September 2002 Pyro testing, 13-14 September 2002

Completed successfully **Completed successfully Completed successfully** Completed successfully

ACS node design flaw uncovered during TV testing

ACS node regualification, 1-6 October 2002

Thermal Vacuum Testing, 20-30 September 2002

Completed successfully

System-level environmental testing went extremely smoothly in large part because of extensive prior testing at component and subsystem level. The presence of good test chambers at UCB made it technically and economically feasible for the team to carry out such tests during the schedule breaks that inevitably arise.



Lessons Learned – Testing CHIPS Testing Phase Very Successful

NASA/GSFC UNEX Missions

CHIPS Testing Comparison to other Small Missions (7/9/02)

ITEM	CHIPS	SNOE	TERRIER S	HETE-2 (1st launch campaign)	HETE-2 (2nd launch campaign)
Component Level Testing					
				1 to 3	1 to 3
Thermal Vac Cycles/Time	4/100 hrs	3/36hrs		20 to 120 hrs	20 to 120 hrs
RF system (Tx/Rx)	272/1576hrs		0.2	~200 hrs	~200 hrs
ACS - Reaction Wheels	3400 hrs			0 to 20 hours	0 to 20 hours
Instrument(s)	TBD hrs		~ 150 hrs	40 to 360 hrs	40 to 560 hrs
S/C Bus - Flight config.					
Spacecraft w/o RF system	1973 hrs			~2000 hrs	~2000 hrs
Spacecraft w/ RF system	272 hrs	1240 hrs	3000 hrs	1200+ hrs	6000+ hrs
Observatory Level Testing					
Vibration Testing	3 axis	3 axis	3 axis	3 axis	3 axis
Thermal Vac Cycles/Time	170 hrs	170 hrs	170 hrs	4 / 260 hrs	4 / 260 hrs**
0 faults w/ ACS Node fixe	150 hrs	500.0	350.0		700 hrs ***
Total Obsvtry. Run Time	847*	560.0	3000.0	1200.0	6000.0

Notes:

^{*} Planned Observatory Testing for CHIPS

^{**} After launch scrub 8 cycles and 240 hours of additional thermal (not thermal-vac) testing performed

for final version of flight s/w; additional 1000 hrs run on flight spare processors.



Lessons Learned – Evolving Launch Vehicle

- ☐ Changes in key parameters (available volume, mass, orbit) led to less-than-optimal final configuration
 - ☐ 1/3 of instrument throughput lost to descope to fit GPS launch opportunity
 - ☐ ICESat opportunity arose on too tight a schedule to restore the descope
- ☐ Fundamental change in project scope (from providing an instrument for a commercial communications s/c to providing both an instrument and dedicated s/c) was only partially reflected in changes to P.I. team structure; team was always about one FTE short...



Lessons Learned – Launch Vehicle

- □ LV provider (Boeing) provided timely "deliverables list" to CHIPS, but detailed content of what was required was not always evident; there were some delays in getting information flowing in both directions
- Important errors in technical information
 - ☐ Clamp-band dynamic envelope
 - □ Predicted launch loads, esp. predictions for MECO event, were much too conservative – created redesign / rework, schedule delays, and loss of some flight hardware (broken optic) during testing



UNEX Lessons Learned Summary

UNEX did not reached its potential as low-cost educational science missions. Due to primarily to the Cost and Availability of access to space.

What has been successful regarding UNEX?

- Facilitates science at the university level.
- Fills a science and technology niche between suborbital and orbital projects.
- Gives students hands-on instrument/spacecraft development experience.
- Promotes participation by minority universities.
- Provides entrée for small spacecraft builders into aerospace industry.

What has not been successful regarding UNEX?

- Low cost access to space did not become available.
- Principal Investigators (PI) were unsuccessful at arranging launch services by themselves.
- Universities didn't have adequate resources to meet SR&QA requirements

The future alternative concept for launching small university-class satellites on EELVs offers hope to maintain the science, technology and educational outreach components.

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Backup charts

CHIPS RESIDUAL RISK ASSESSMENT

<u>Issue</u>	Residual Risk	<u>Mitigation</u>
	High	
Single String Design	(medium-high)*	- Test Program was thorough and relatively trouble free
		- Redundant Reaction Wheel
		- Few mechanisms, few cycles, Only one mechanical SPF
	High	
Extensive Use of	(medium-high)	- Passed full environmental test program
Commercial Parts		- Instrument has mostly Grade 2 parts
 Uncertain radiation tolerance (SEE & TID) 		(from prior UCB missions).
- Limited Alert searches and applicability		* (risk level for minimum mission)

CHIPS RESIDUAL RISK ASSESSMENT (Continued)

<u>Issue</u>	Residual Risk	<u>Mitigation</u>
Lack of Instrument Performance Headroom - Sensitivity is already slightly less than required - No inst. "performance" test at S/C level	High (medium)	 Design has 6 spectrograph channels Some degradation/failures can be overcome by more observing time
- "Hot spot" on detector Late RF System Redesign	Medium (medium)	 Passed full environmental test program Tx/Rx parts received additional GSFC scrutiny

CHIPS RESIDUAL RISK ASSESSMENT (Continued)

<u>Issue</u>	Residual Risk	<u>Mitigation</u>
VERY Small TeamFour person ops teamVulnerable to loss of critical knowledge	Medium (low-medium)	 Plans being developed to manage credible personnel non-availability Simple spacecraft, safe in tumble, most anomalies would not require urgent action
Process Control (Electrostatic discharge; Contamination; Other) - Virgin S/C contractor - Untried suppliers - University inst and I&T facility	Medium (low-medium)	 Successful integration and test results Mostly trouble free Observatory environmental test program No "evidence" of any degradation

CHIPS RESIDUAL RISK ASSESSMENT (Continued)

<u>Issue</u>	Residual Risk	<u>Mitigation</u>
Late ACS Node Problem - Discovered at S/C level environmental test - Non-standard repair configurations	Low (low)	 299 hours failure free Problem well understood and duplicated on other platforms Full unit level environmental retest Full circuit analysis for modified circuit
Instrument Alignment - No UV alignment and efficiency measurements after S/C integration - Instrument level vib test resulted in alignment problems	Low (low)	 Structural mods implemented Retested and passed at instrument level Some degradation/failures can be overcome by more observing time

OVERALL ASSESSMENT - HIGH RISK MISSION

Medium-High for minimum mission

CHIPSat MISSION READINESS REVIEW INDEPENDENT READINESS ASSESSMENT CHIPSat Management Process Scores – November 2002

		<u>UNEX</u>	Typical Mission
1)	Technical Peer Reviews	7.5	5.4
2)	System Level Reviews	7.5	6.0
3)	Integration & Test Plan	7.1	5.1
4)	Mission Assurance	7.3	5.3
5)	Systems Management	7.0	5.3
6)	Staffing & Experience	6.3	5.3
7)	Integration & Test Results	7.4	6.1
8)	Operating Hours	7.5	6.8
9)	Tech Review Process Results	7.1	6.4
10)	Mission Sims/Training	7.1	5.6
11)	FMEA/FTA/PRA Process	7.3	5.1
12)	Mission Req'ts Verification Matrix	7.0	4.5
13)	Single Point Failure Analysis	6.0	4.5

Thirteen Points Summary

Nominal: 7

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6.3

- SpaceDev's first major contract, first flight hardware, first spacecraft
- New facility All processes/practices/procedure new for CHIPSat
- Inexperienced teams First spacecraft for both SpaceDev and PI; Many young key personnel "thirty-something"
- VERY small team Vulnerable to turnover and burnout

13) Single Point Failure Analysis

6.0

- No formal SPF analysis performed
- No formal PRA performed
- Reliability estimates performed as part of FTA
- Primary justification for SPF's is cost, not technical



Small Satellites – Report Card

·			
	PI/Sponsor	Mission Lifetime	Post Mission Observations
PANSAT STS-95 (Oct 98)	U.S. Naval Academy	Still Operating	SUCCESS: operations after deployment; utilized the original "NUSAT" design for simplicity purposes since goal was educational tool for students
MightySat-1 STS-88 (Dec 98)	U.S. Air Force	11 months	SUCCESS: operations after deployment; users developing next spacecraft (FalconSat-2) with less complex subsystems; mission cost for MightySat approx. \$5M
SAC-A STS-88 (Dec 98)	CONAE (Argentina)	10.5 months	SUCCESS: operations after deployment; onboard camera images successfully downloaded
Starshine-1 STS-96 (May 99)	Utah State/G. Moore (Code F/HQ)	8.5 months	PARTIAL SUCCESS: Ejection system deployed spacecraft "too smoothly"; was expecting small tip-off to achieve sparkle effect; spacecraft design that flew was descoped considerably from original concept due to lack of available expertise and resources to PI; 80% successful
Simplesat STS-105 (Aug 01)	GSFC/924 D. Skillman	5.5 months	FAILURE: Unable to establish communications with spacecraft; launched intentionally with dead batteries in effort to simplify STS safety process (a cost and effort reducing strategy that may have been catastrophic)
Starshine-2	Utah State/G.	On orbit	PARTIAL SUCCESS: N2 spin-up system failed due to improper